

# Devices outside the Enterprise perimeter



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# Outline

- Device diversity among users
- Many services and perimeters
- Usage across many perimeters
- The *Beyond Corp* architecture
- Administration / risk model
- Challenges and complications
- Directions and further work

A low-angle shot of a red roller coaster track against a blue sky with scattered white clouds. The track curves upwards and then downwards. Several passenger cars are visible, with people inside. One car has a sign that says "BUZZ".

# Vision: User Experience

**work from anywhere**

**cloud based workflows**

**limit access by policy only**

# Moats & Castles




high walls

strong gates

bad guys on the outside


intrinsic trust

# Usual Architecture




# Devices not equivalent

Some are trusted more than others; complicated



# Trying to fix architecture



One VPN configuration per service and per device type?  
But then ... how to use more than one at a time?

An aerial photograph of a large, ancient stone castle with multiple towers and a central courtyard. The castle is built with grey stone and has several tall, cylindrical towers. The courtyard is green with a paved path. In the background, there is a body of water and a clear blue sky. The text is overlaid on the image in white, bold, sans-serif font.

**evolved attackers/attacks**

**hitting the weakest link**

**infect users when outside**

**user can pass firewall**



**Access SRE ...**

**No "Perimeter"**

**Authentication**

**Authorization**

**Encryption**



**“Re-architect corporate services to remove any privileges associated with having a corporate network address.”**



# Architecture Blueprint


**move trust to device level**

**device identity**


**device inventory**

**authZ on device state**

# Beyond Corp Architecture



# as a Reverse Web Proxy



# Access Policy Examples

Payroll	Dashboard	Café Menu
Device Authentication	Device Authentication	Device Authentication
User Authentication		
Actively Managed	Actively Managed	
Patch Level Up-to-date	Patch Level Up-to-date	
Full Disk Encryption		

# Rule Example - Cafe

```
( url.hostname is 'google-menu.appspot.com'  
& url.port = 443  
& url.protocol is 'https'  
) then permit  
  named 'Menu_Permit'  
  tested_by 'menu_permit_test';
```

# Rule Example - Dashboard

```
( url.port = 443
& url.protocol is 'https'
& service is 'cluster-dashboard'
& ( employee
  | intern
  | user in 'ldap/cluster-dashboard-roles'
  | user in 'group/cluster' )
& (google_managed_primary_device
  | role_managed_device )
then permit named 'cluster-dashboard' tested_by
'cd_any_employee_from_remote_managed_device'
'cd_any_intern_from_onsite_managed_device'
'cd_app_engine_role_from_app_engine_device' [etc]
```



# Rule Example - Payroll ?

- No, that ACL doesn't fit on the slide
- Why not?
  - Real world ACLs are complicated
  - Once you study the corner cases
- Need an expressive language
  - Avoid assuming user behavior
  - No broad permissive generalizations



# Bootstrapping Challenges

device identity

inventory data quality

gatekeeping

dependency on user creds

# Workflow Challenges



systems management

network latency

“untrusting” the network

long tail/legacy workflows



**Internet != https**

**Generic tcp socket proxy**

**Often, just a websocket**

**Most protocols will work**

**Else need user&device IDs**

# Advice & Directions



build support

get the data/build the gate

develop web first

# Comparing the models

	Perimeter	Beyond Corp
Usability	remote access solution may be required	"It just works"
Applicability	internal network only	on all networks, including internet
Trust based on	IP Address	device ID and state
Strong attribution of access	very difficult (think NAT)	easily possible (even across tiers)
Segregation	only works on the internal network	per device/service from all networks
Inventory data quality	data quality hard to improve	much better as inventory drives the process

# Questions?



[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caernarfon\\_Castle](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caernarfon_Castle)

Images: Herbert Ortner and others

